According to OECD data 1, the external debts of developing countries totalled $ 625 billion at the end of 1982. As this does not include certain forms of credit, their indebtedness can be estimated at more than $ 700 billion, of which $ 500 billion consists just of bank loans. The resultant burden of interest and redemption payments has become so great that many more developing countries will be forced to Seek rescheduling in the future. The debt burdens of developing countries and the vulnerability of the world financial system must be reduced for development policy reasons and also to ensure that the economies of the industrialised countries are not harmed. The following study suggests how this may be done.
T
he debt position of the Third World is far more precarious than the picture reflected in the problems of those few developing countries that have attracted widespread attention as the largest debtors. In recent years the debt burden ratios for practically all developing countries have deteriorated dramatically and the number of rescheduling operations has rocketed (see Table 1 ).
This has significance not only for the internal development of Third World countries but also for the operational ability of the international financial system. Whereas for the economies of the developing countries it is the overall burden of all (private and official) external liabilities that is decisive, for the world financial system it is primarily the relations between the banks and the developing countries that are important. Even a relatively modest volume of debt can pose great problems for the economy of a small developing country, a commonplace fact that is often overlooked in the present debate. Table 3 shows that the countries with a particularly heavy burden of debt in relation to their national product are indeed the smaller ones. By contrast, the workings of the world's financial markets are affected at present only by the situation with regard to a few countries with very high indebtedness towards the banks.
The internal and external causes of the widespread debt crises form a web of interwoven factors, some of which are mutually reinforcing. Chief among these are: 2 [] a hard core of loans taken up after the first oil price increase and which at that time helped to overcome the crisis of adjustment relatively easily and quickly, 3 Balance of payments deficits on current account, which had grown rapidly as a result of the worldwide recession and the increase in the price of oil, had to be covered mainly by borrowing on commercial terms. This was facilitated by the existence of an international liquidity surplus, which induced the banks to accept ever greater risks in their pursuit of investment opportunities ("recycling pressure"). It must be said that for a long time the banks were encouraged from all sides to play a part in recycling the oil producers' current account surpluses and in promoting the export trade of their home country. Had the industrialised and developing countries been able to exploit the potential for GNP growth, lending by the banks would subsequently have proved a success and as a rule the borrowing countries would have been able to meet their payment commitments.
The debt service payments (interest and capital) that are due on the accumulated external borrowing are creating grave problems of adjustment for a great many countries in view of the worldwide stagnation in demand, the still high interest rates and the lack of new financial resources in the quantities hitherto available. Since the middle of 1982 bank lending to developing countries has contracted dramatically; for many of them, and in particular for those at an intermediate level of development, it is even significantly lower than in the preceding year. Hence the way is barred for the developing countries to borrow their way out and they must attempt to establish a new balance of payments equilibrium by pursuing restrictive import and budgetary policies.
The effects of this policy of adjustment are already being felt in many countries. In 1982 the current account deficit of the non-oil developing countries is reckoned to have been a third less than in the previous year ($ 65 billion compared with $ 96 billion) and a further reduction to about $ 50 billion is expected in 1983, a "success" that has been achieved at the cost of declining rates of economic growth everywhere. In the group of middle-income and poorer oil-importing countries 4 the per capita national product will contract even more sharply in 1983 than in the two preceding years.
With the prevailing universal weakness of demand, the developing countries' efforts to adjust are unlikely on their own to raise or restore their creditworthiness. On the contrary, there is the danger that the subordination of economic policy to short-term balance of payments requirements will lead to a downward spiral. Import restrictions do initially release foreign exchange for servicing the country's foreign debts, but in many instances they also harm export production, thus jeopardising both the standard of living of the bulk of the population and the enterprises in the developing countries: many firms that have borrowed fairly heavily abroad are driven into bankruptcy by changes in interest and exchange rates.
On the other hand, justified hope can be felt in the flexibility of countries that have already achieved initial success in modernising their economies and integrating into the world economy. This applies not only to the small circle of newly industrialised countries but also to a larger number of countries at the intermediate level of development. Many of them will quickly be able to escape from their present constrained situation as soon as an upturn in world trade begins. However, such an upturn cannot be expected to occur in the immediate future and will be induced only to a minor extent by the efforts of the developing countries themselves.
In late 1982 an acute crisis in the world financial system was averted. Problems had arisen as a result of
